Calendar

Course Outline


PART #	TITLE	# OF LECTURES	TOPICS


I	Static Games	4	Modeling strategic interaction (FT 1.1, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, G 1.1AB) Nash Equilibrium (FT 1.2, G 1.1C, 1.2) Mixed strategies (FT 1.1, 1.2.3, G 1.3) Existence theorems, other properties (FT 1.3, 12.1, G 1.3)


II	Dynamic Games	4	Extensive form games (FT 3.3, 3.4.2, 3.5, G 2.1, 2.4) Subgame perfection (FT 3.5, G 2.2) Examples, repeated games (FT 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 13.1, G 2.3)


III	Incomplete Information	2	Types, Bayesian equilibrium, examples (FT 6.1-6.4, 6.7, G 3.1-3.2)


IV	Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information	2	PBE concept, signalling, reputation (FT 8.1-8.2, 9.1-9.2, G 4.1-4.2, 4.3C) Refinements (FT 11.2-11.3, G 4.4)

FT Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press, 1991)

G Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton University Press, 1992)